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Notes
FINANCE COMPANY AS A HOLDER IN DUE COURSE
A. INTIODUCTION
In order to have a progressive economy, it generally is felt neces-
sary to pursue a policy which will give the consumer as many material
advantages as possible. Financing institutions occupy a vital position
in effecting this policy.' In the typical situation, the buyer signs for
the retailer (1) a note, (2) a note attached by perforation to a
conditional sales contract,2 or (3) a conditional sales contract.3 Since
1 In December 1960 there was $17,444,000,000 outstanding in automobile
installment loans, and $14,664,000,000 in installment credit arising out of sales
of other consumer goods. Federal Reserve System, Board of Governors, Federal
Reserve Bulletin, 47 Fed. Res. Bull. 1391 (1961).
The importance of financing institutions to the automobile industry is
exemplified in Buffalo Industrial Bank v. DeMarzio, 162 Misc. 742, 296 N.Y.S.
783, 785 (Buffalo City Ct. 1937), as follows:
It is common knowledge that, whatever the situation as to finance
companies was in the past, today they have become de facto depart-
ments of the great automobile businesses, without which these indus-
tries could no more operate than sans their assembly lines.
2 Not within the scope of this work, but a point on which courts disagree, is
whether the negotiability of these notes is destroyed by their attachment to a
conditional sales contract at the time the buyer signs. It is assumed in this work
that the question of the effect of attachment has been resolved in favor of
negotiability.
3 It should be pointed out that instruments not in their nature negotiable
have, by means of a waiver of defense clause, been treated by many courts as if
they were negotiable for the purpose of giving finance companies the status of a
holder in due course. See, e.g., Young v. John Deere Plow Co., 102 Ga. App. 132,
115 S.E.2d 770 (1960); National City Bank v. Prospect Syndicate, Inc., 170
Misc. 611, 10 N.Y.S.2d 759 (N.Y. Mumc. Ct. 1939). The reason such contracts
are treated as negotiable instruments is expressed in United States ex rel. Admr
of Fed. Housing Admimstration v. Troy-Pansian, Inc., 115 F.2d 224, 226 (9th
Cir. 1940), cert. dented, 312 U.S. 699 (1941), as follows:
Since the parties nught originally have put their contract in negotiable
form, there would appear to be no good reason why they may not by
agreement impart to it limited elements of negotiability. Buyer and
seller stood on equal footing and it is evident that this clause was
deliberately inserted as a means of facilitating the finance of the
sale.
The typical situation is as follows: The non-negotiable contract involved
contains a clause to the effect that the buyer waives his right to enforce against
an assignee any claim or defense he might have against the seller. Such a
clause is effective only against personal defenses that the buyer might have, and
the assignee must meet the requirements of a holder in due course of a negotiable
instrument. Contra, Commercial Credit Corp. v. Biagi, 11 Ill. App. 2d 30, 136
N.E.2d 580 (1956), where the court said the assignee would be protected by the
waiver of defenses clause regardless of whether it was a holder in due course.
(Continued on next page)
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the retailer usually does a large part of his business m this manner, he
needs the purchase price immediately in order to restore his inventory;
hence, he often negotiates or assigns to the financing institution such
instruments given hin by the consumer. If the finance company is
considered a holder in due course of the negotiable instrument,4 then
any personal defense 5 that the consumer may have against the
retailer is inoperative against the finance company Thus, the finance
company can enforce the instrument against the consumer even
though the consumer has not received the consideration for which he
bargained.
When the financier attempts to enforce the obligation of the note
upon which the buyer has defaulted, usually the seller is unscrupulous
and insolvent, thereby leaving worthless any remedy that the buyer
might have against the seller.6
Actions of a finance company such as financing all or most of the
sales by a particular retailer, providing the form for the note, making
the original note payable at its office, and checking the buyers credit
before the sale, have been the basis for the view that the finance
company should not be treated as a holder in due course. There are
decisions supporting a contrary view 7
The following discussion is designed to (1) point out some of the
conflicting decisions as well as the policy arguments to support each
position, (2) attempt to reveal the position of the Uniform Commercial
Code in Kentucky, and (3) recommend a logical solution to this
delicate problem.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Some states by statute or decision consider waiver of defenses clauses to be
against the public policy of protecting innocent purchasers of consumer goods,
hence, they consider them invalid. Thus it is inpossible for finance companies to
attain the status of a holder m due course by use of such a clause. However, if
the waiver of defense clause is considered valid, post-1940 courts seldom have
held that the finance company can be a holder m due course.
4 Included within thus reasoning is the situation where the waiver of defenses
clause in the non-negotiable conditional sales contract is considered valid,
thereby giving the financier, as assignee of the contract, the status of a holder In
due course.
5 Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (hereinafter cited as N.I.L. in
footnotes and text) §57 provides:
A holder in due course holds the instrument free from any defect
of title of prior parties, and free from defenses available to prior
parties among themselves, and may enforce payment of the instru-
ment for the full amount thereof against all parties liable thereon.6 See, e.g., Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1953). If the
dealer is solvent, the buyer can go against hn, and the problem of whether the
finance company is a holder in due course does not arise.
7E.g., Public Loan Corp. v. Terrell, 224 Ark. 616 275 S.W.2d 435 (1955);
White Sys. v. Hall, 219 La. 440, 53 So. 2d 227 (1951); Implement Credit Corp.
v. Elsinger, 268 Wis. 143, 66 N.W.2d 657 (1954).
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B. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF ThE TRUE IssuE
There is a real problem m defining a majority and minority view
as to whether the finance company is a holder in due course. It is clear
after a careful inspection of the cases that the newer view, holding a
finance company which is active in the transaction responsible for the
dealers wrongs,s is gaming m strength, but the older view, that the
finance company is a holder m due course, is still referred to as the
majority view
The decisions following the so-called majority view are based on
the traditional concept of the rights of a holder in due course of a
negotiable instrument. Illustrative of the cases following this view is
Public Loan Corp. v. Terrell.9 The buyer executed a note and a con-
ditional sales contract to the seller, the finance company having pre-
pared the note and contract forms. On the day of the sale the note and
contract were assigned to the finance company The item purchased
was defective, and the buyer defaulted. The finance company sued
on the note, and the buyer raised the following defenses: (1) that
there was failure of consideration; and (2) that to all intents and
purposes the finance company was a party to the transaction. Since
the note was assigned before maturity and for a valuable considera-
tion, and since there was no evidence of actual notice or bad faith, the
court held that the finance company was a holder in due courseO
This is the expected and logical result if negotiable mstruments law is
followed.
The decisions following the majority view are predicated on the
fact that the financier meets the requirements of a holder in due
course. As stated in the N.I.L., a holder in due course is one who
has taken the instrument under the following conditions:
1. That it is complete and regular upon its face;
2. That he became the holder of it before it had been previously
dishonored, if such was the fact;
3. That he took it in good faith and for value;
4. That at the time it was negotiated to hin he had no notice of any
infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person
negotiating it."i
The question as to what constitutes notice is treated in the N.I.L.
as follows:
S E.g., Public Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Fernandez, 121 N.Y.S.2d. 721 (N.Y.
Mume. Ct. 1952); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County Mach. Works, 84
Cal. App. 2d 766, 214 P.2d 819 (1950).
9 224 Ark. 616, 275 S.W.2d 435 (1955).
10 Many pre-1940 cases follow this view. E.g., Standard Acceptance Corp. v.
Chapin, 277 Mass. 278, 178 N.E. 538 (1981); Mayer v. Amencan Fin. Corp.,
172 Okla. 419, 45 P.2d 497 (1935).
3. N.I.L. §52.
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To constitute notice of an infirmity m the instrument or defect
in the title of the person negotiating the same, the person to whom
it is negotiated must have had actual knowledge of the infirmity or
defect, or knowledge of such facts that his action m taking the
instrument amounted to bad faith.'2 (Emphasis supplied.)
The difficulty m showing that the finance company has notice was
increased when the courts took the position that the intent of the
N.I.L. was to adopt a subjective test, thereby requiring actual bad
faith on the part of the finance company.13
The fact that most of the cases holding for the finance company
on strict negotiable instruments law were decided before 1940 should
not be overlooked. The importance of the finance company m com-
mercial transactions was not so pronounced then as it is today 14 In
fact, most pre-1940 courts treated negotiations involving finance com-
panies the same as any other negotiations, and did not seem to
recognize the peculiar problems presented when a financier was
involved.
Since 1940 many courts have looked behind the techmcal require-
ments to what .is actually happening when a retailer negotiates
commercial paper to a finance company with whom he has a close
connection. The landmark case holding a finance company subject
to the defenses of the buyer is Commercial Credit Corp. v. Childs.15
In this case the form of the note was furnished by the finance company,
and the note and contract were executed the same day the assignment
was made. The court held that the finance company was so closely
connected with the sale that it could not be a bona fide purchaser of
the instrument and to all intents and purposes it was an original
party to the transaction.'0 Other courts have followed the Childs case
upon the theory that the seller was an agent of the finance company 17
The true reason for the refusal of some courts to recognize the
finance company as a holder in due course is to protect the innocent
12 N.I.L. §56.
13 E.g., Howard Nat'l Bank v. Wilson, 96 Vt. 438, 120 A. 889 (1923).
14 In December 1960 there was $17,444,000,000 outstanding m automobile
installment credit, and $14,664,000,000 m installment credit arising out of sales
of other consumer goods. Federal Reserve System, Board of Governors, Federal
Reserve Bulletin, 47 Fed. Res. Bull. 1391 (1961). In December 1939 there was
$1,267,000,000 outstanding in automobile installment loans, and $1,525,000,000
in installment credit arising out of sales of other consumer goods. Federal
Reserve System, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve Bulletin, 31 Fed. Res. Bull.
478 (1945).
'5 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940).
16Accord, Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County Mach. Works, 34
Cal. App. 2d 766, 214 P.2d 819 (1950); Public Natl Bank & Trust Co. v.
Fernandez, 121 N.Y.S.2d 721 (N.Y. Mumc. Ct. 1952).
'7 E.g., Associates Discount Corp. v. Goetznger, 245 Iowa 326, 62 N.W.2d
191 (1954).
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purchaser. This policy is expressed in Mutual Finance Co. v. Martin
as follows:
[T]he buyer should have some protection somewhere along the
line. We believe the finance company is better able to bear the risk
of the dealer s insolvency than the buyer and in far better position
to protect his interests against unscrupulous and insolvent dealers.18
Because of the increased complexity of our economy, the buyer must
necessarily depend more and more on the representations of others,
thereby accentuating the strong need for a policy of this kind.
There are also policy considerations in support of the finance
company s position. The basic premise that between two innocent
parties the holder n due course will be protected, and the deep-
rooted idea that the free flow of commerce should not be impaired,1 9
are the principal considerations advanced by the courts.2 0 The finance
companies contend that the only way a large majority of the people
can have many consumer items is through financng agencies, and that
the financing agency cannot profitably engage in such transactions
unless it is considered a holder in due course, free of claims the buyer
may have against the seller.
2 1
In a 1954 case,22 a finance company, which was incorporated by
members of an implement dealers association, purchased commercial
paper only from members. It was incorporated for this express purpose,
and supplied the blank note forms. On these facts the Childs doctrine
easily could have been followed, but the court followed negotiable
instruments law and held the finance company to be a holder in due
course.
Is 63 So. 2d 649, 653 (Fla. 1953).
19 See National City Bank v. Prospect Syndicate, 170 Misc. 611, 10 N.Y.S.2d
759, 765 (1939). Here the court in holding a waiver of defense agreement valid,
recognized that unless the company was given the status of a holder in due
course, the free flow of commerce would be obstructed.
20 When the usual situation, where the buyer gives a note and contract to
the seller who immediately assigns them to the finance company, is compared
with the situation where the buyer borrows directly from the financier and then
makes a cash purchase from the seller, another policy consideration is suggested
in favor of the finance company. After the seller becomes insolvent why should
the buyer to whom the seller has extended credit, be protected, while the buyer
who pays cash to the seller is not protected? See Jones, Finance Companies as
Holders in Due Course of Consumer Paper, Wash. U.L.Q. 177 (1958); 7 Personal
Finance L.Q. 76, 78 (1953).
21 The soundness of this argument is questioned by looking to the low
percentage of net loss to average loans outstanding. In 1955 this percentage was
1.92. Federal Reserve System, Board of Governors, Consumer Installment Credit,
43 Fed. Res. Bull. 1317 (1957). When this is compared to the high percentage
of return (including both interest and finance charges) which the finance com-
pany usually receives, the trend toward protecting the consumer is understandable.2 2 Implement Credit Corp. v. Elsmger, 268 Wis. 143, 66 N.W.2d 657 (1954);
accord, White Sys. v. Hall, 219 La. 440, 53 So. 2d 227 (1951).
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The inconsistent state of the law in this area is evident. At present,
in determining whether the finance company should be a holder in due
course, the real issue seems to be whether (1) to protect the consumer
from unscrupulous dealers, or (2) to encourage unhampered trade
through easy negotiability of commercial paper.
C. THE STATus OF THE FINANcE ComPANY UNDERTE
UNIFORM CoMMcrCIA CODE IN KENTUCKY
The requirements of a holder in due course under the Uniform
Commercial Code are that the instrument must be taken (1) for
value, (2) in good faith, and (3) without notice that it is overdue or
has been dishonored, or of any defense or claim to it on the part of any
person.23 The requirements are essentially the same as those of the
N.I.L.24
The drafters of the Code were confronted with whether good faith
was to be determined by an objective or subjective standard. Con-
sistent with the cases under the N.I.L., the 1957 draft of the Code
made it clear that good faith is to be determined subjectively 25 Thus,
there seems to be little doubt that, if based solely on the above
discussed sections of the Code, there exists the same difficulty as was
found in the N.I.L. in trying to keep the financier from being a holder
in due course.
However, if a sales contract contains a waiver of defenses clause
an additional section of the Code must be considered. The older
version of section 9-206(1)n6 prevented such a contract from assuming
the elements of negotiability of the attached note, therefore the waiver
of defenses clause was inoperative and the financier was subject to
any defenses the buyer might have against the seller. The 1957
23 Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter referred to in the footnotes as UCC
and in the text as Code) §3-302(1).
24 See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
25 In the 1952 draft, §3-302(1) (b) provided that a holder in due course
is a holder who takes the instrument "in good faith, including observances of
the reasonable commercial standards of any business in which the holder may be
engaged." The 1957 draft merely requires that the holder take the instrument
"in good faith," which is defined in §1-201(19) as "honesty in fact in the conduct
or transaction concerned."
20 UCC §9-206(1) (1952) provides:
An agreement by a buyer of consumer goods as part of the contract
for sale that he will not assert against as assignee any clain or defense
arising out of the sale is not enforceable by any person. If such buyer
as part of one transaction signs both a negotiable instrument and a
security agreement even a holder in due course of the negotiable in-
strument is sublect to such clain or defense if he seeks to enforce
the security interest either by proceeding under the security agree-
ment or by attaching or levying upon the goods in an action upon
the instrument.
19621
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revision of the Code makes a substantial change m this provision. It
provides that:
Subject to any statute or decision to the contrary which estab-
lishes a different rule for buyers of consumer goods, an agreement
by a buyer that he will not assert against an assignee any claim or
defense which he may have against the seller is enforceable by an
assignee for value, m good faith and without notice of a claim or
defense, except as to defenses of a type which may be asserted
against a holder m due course of a negotiable instrument under the
Article on Commercial Paper (Article 3). A buyer who as part of
one transaction signs both a negotiable mstrument and a security
agreement makes such an agreement.
27
As applied to transactions involving non-consumer goods, the intention
of this section is to give the finance company the protection of a
holder in due course. This protection arises because the instrument
acqires the elements of negotiability The Kentucky Court of Appeals
so interpreted this section of the Code in Walter I. Hieb Sand
Gravel, Inc. v. Universal Credit Corp2
In contracts involving the sale of consumer goods, there are at
least two different interpretations of section 9-206(1) regarding the
validity of a waiver of defenses clause. The first interpretation is that
the phrase "subject to any statute or decision which establishes a
different rule for buyers of consumer goods" leaves to the courts
complete freedom in deciding the validity of a waiver of defenses
clause in a conditional sales contract for consumer goods.2 9 The second
interpretation is that a waiver of defenses clause is valid if there are no
statutes or judicial decisions to the contrary 30 This interpretation
would validate waiver clauses when the case is one of first impression,
while the former would leave the validity of waiver clauses to be
determined by the court in such cases. From the wording of the Code
the second position seems more logical.
During the limited period of time in which the Code has been in
effect, the Kentucky Court of Appeals has not been called upon to
interpret section 9-206(1). However, based upon their discussion of
this section in the Hieb case and upon what would appear to be the
more logical interpretation of the section, it is reasonable to assume
that waiver clauses will be valid in sales of both non-consumer and
consumer goods. However, if section 9-206(1) is interpreted to allow
27 UCC §9-206(1).
28 332 S.W.2d 619 (K. 1959). This case was decided after the adoption
of the Code but before its effective date.
29See UCC §9-206, official comment 2, which provides that the Code "takes
no position on the controversial question whether a buyer of consumer goods may
effectively waive defenses by contractual clause"30 Note, Finance Companies and Banks as Holders in Due Course of Con-
sumer Installment Credit Paper, 55 Nw. U.L. Rev. 389, 401-02 (1961).
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the court the freedom of deciding the validity of the waiver of defenses
clause, there remains the possibility that Kentucky will hold the
clauses invalid.
Because of the serious implication of this problem, it is suggested
that the Code, in an effort to establish uniformity, should have taken
a definite position on this matter.31 The result of this failure by the
Code is that the different states, which have contrary statutes32 or
decisions, will arrive at different results on virtually the same facts.33
It seems reasonable to predict that the general "hands off" attitude
of the Code will certainly limit its effect on future decisions in this
area, and will leave the courts in little better position than they were
before its adoption. Apparently, most courts will recognize the great
need for protection of consumers, and will continue the trend started
by the Childs case and adopt its policy However, courts which have
decided for the financier under the N.I.L. may continue to do so
under the Code.
D. CONCLuSION
The basic purpose behind the creation of negotiable instruments
is to enable credit to be transferred easily Under the older, so-called
majority view, notes taken by a seller and discounted to a financier
are considered negotiable, although they are not intended to be
transferred further. Since such notes lack the purpose of a negotiable
instrument, they should not be treated as such. On the other hand,
the strong policy of protecting the consumer has led many courts to
decide against the flnancier. These courts at least saw the umque
problem involved, and realized that the notes taken by the financier
were not actually negotiable instruments. However, it is believed that
these courts have not followed the right path.3 4 The course that should
have been taken was suggested in White Sys. v. Hall,35 where the
court took the position that the N.I.L. was clear, and that if the
consumer needed protection from finance compames which were using
the N.I.L. as a shield, then the legislature, and not the courts, should
remedy the situation.
The lack of uniformity in this area of the law should be eradicated
by uniform legislation. The Code has failed to accomplish this.
Jefferson V Layson, Jr
31UCC article 3 (negotiable instruments) does not mention the peculiar
problem involved, and §9-206(1), official comment 1, expressly refuses to take a
position as to the validity of waiver of defense clauses.32 See, e.g., Md. Stat. art. 83, §148 (1957); Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 95, §26
(1953); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 69, §615(F) (Supp. 1961).33 King, The Unprotected Consumer-Maker Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 65 Deck. L. Rev. 207, 214-15 (1961).34 See 10 N.Y.U. Intra. L. Rev. 198 (1955).
35 219 La. 440, 53 So. 2d 227 (1951).
